Review of: Guillelmus de Aragonia, De nobilitate animi, ed. and trans. William D. Paden and Mario Trovato. (Harvard Studies in Medieval Latin 2.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. Pp. xvi, 193. $40. ISBN: 978-0-674-06812-4.

Alexander von Aphrodisias (ca. 200 n. Chr.) schrieb nicht nur uber das Buch De anima, sondern auch uber viele naturwissenschaftliche und uber samtliche logische Schriften des Aristoteles. Gegen Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts wiesen die Humanisten auf die Bedeutung der griechischen Ausleger fur das Verstandnis der aristotelischen Logik hin. In diesem Zusammenhang wurden um die Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts samtliche Kommentare Alexanders zur aristotelischen Logik ins Lateinische ubersetzt. Die vorliegenden Kommentare zur Topik und Sophistik wurden von dem bekannten Ubersetzer Dorotheus ins (...) Lateinische ubertragen. (shrink)

In der Geschichte der Logik spielt die Darstellung verschiedener formallogischer Sachverhalte in veranschaulichenden Figuren eine grosse Rolle. Eines der bekanntesten Beispiele solcher Figuren ist die beruhmte pons asinorum oder Eselsbrucke. Diese Figur findet sich zum erstenmal in dem Kommentar des Johannes Philoponos zu den Ersten Analytiken des Aristoteles. Die griechischen Aristoteliker haben einen bedeutenden Beitrag zur Weiterentwicklung der Syllogistik geleistet. Einige ihrer Beitrage - wie dieser der Eselsbrucke - wurden durch Averroes und Albert den Grossen der lateinischen Tradition weitergegeben. Die (...) meisten haben aber auf die Ubersetzertatigkeit des 16. Jahrhunderts warten mussen, bevor sie im Rahmen der Argumentationstheorie voll zur Geltung kamen. (shrink)

In dem bislang wenig beachteten Kodex Ms. lat. fol. 456 der Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz zu Berlin fanden wir unter den vielen, zumeist anonym überlieferten Werken des 13. Jahrhunderts eine interessante Quaestio, die ein Problem aus dem Bereich der Metaphysik und Sprachlogik zum Gegenstand hat. Der Verfasser dieser Abhandlung, ein gewisser Magister Guillelmus Anglicus, dessen Name wir aus dem Kolophon erfahren, greift die, wie er selbst betont, zu seiner Zeit viel und kontrovers diskutierte Frage auf: Ist der Terminus «Mensch» einem (...) einzigen Sinne nach unterschiedslos sowohl in bezug auf seine in Wirklichkeit seienden als auch nichtseienden Supposita? (shrink)

En este trabajo se estudia la versión del intelecto agente en cuatro pensadores poco conocidos del s. XIV: 1) Guillermo de Alnwick (Guillelmus de Alnwick). 2) Gregorio de Rimini (Gregorius Ariminensis). 3) Tomás de Bailly (Thomas de Bailly). 4) Pedro de Ailly (Petrus de Ailly).

In this study is edited and examined a letter , in which magister Crissius de Fulgineo announces the death of the astronomer Guillelmus de Luna. In the first part are studied the typology and the rhetorical tradition of the letter, then is discussed the question of translations attributed to Guillelmus de Luna or de Lunis or Lunense, and are advanced hypotheses on the translations that Manfredi of Swabia sent at the University of Paris, probably in 1263.In questo saggio (...) viene edita e studiata una lettera con cui il maestro Crissius de Fulgineo annuncia la morte dell’astronomo Guillelmus de Luna. La lettera – di cui vengono studiate innanzitutto la tipologia e la tradizione retorica – offre l’occasione di affrontare la questione delle traduzioni attribuite a Guillelmus de Luna o de Lunis o Lunense, e di avanzare ipotesi su quali furono le traduzioni che furono inviate, probabilmente nel 1263, all’Università di Parigi da Manfredi di Svevia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymus Defensorium Ockham Ms. Romae, bibl. Angelica 1017 ff. 21r-36r Conspectus siglorum: = addendum censeo [....] = delendum censeo«..» = litterae illegibiles factae sive propter codicis corruptionem deperditae [[..]] = scriptor delevit Y.../ = in margine sive supra lineam inserta (?) = lectio incerta t...-t = corrupta esse videntur I22rl = incipit pagina 22 recto codicis«cCapitulum 15. De novem praedicamentis denominativis> Praedicamenta (adn. in mg.: Capitulo 15) alia a (...) substantia sunt quaedam denominationes substantiae. Denominatur enim substantia a qualitate 'qualis', a quantitate 'quanta', a relatione 'relata', \ab/ actione 'agens', et sic de singulis. Unde sicut conceptus ordinati in praedicamento substantiae sunt univoci, habentes univocam praedicationem de substantia prima, ita conceptus ordinati in praedicamentis accidentalibus sunt conceptus denominativi respectu substantiae, habentes praedicationem denominativam de ipsa—licet possunt esse univoci in suo ordine, et de suis inferioribus univoce praedicari. Est autem (adn. in mg.: Quaestio bona quarta) hic investigandum, utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum; ut, sicut sunt denominationes secundum novem genera distinctae, ita res et realitates novem generum distinctae. Quae est utrum novem denominantia substantiam sint dispositiones distinctae realiter a substantia, aut sint 111 Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997 112ANONYMUS dispositiones distinctae tantum ratione, sicut Commentator1 innuit. (adn. in ima pag.: Utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum, id est utrum novem praedicamenta distinctas habent realitates.) Et ista dubitatio de praedicamentis denominativis consimilis est dubitationi superius2 factae de praedicatis univocis et de correspondentia praedicamentorum et realitatum. Et videtur hie conformiter dicendum sicut de praedictis, scilicet quod multitudo rerum non est secundum multitudinem coneeptuum quiditativorum. Et hoc manifestum est, sumentibus nobis suppositiones has: Primo (adn. in mg.: Prima suppositio) quod substantia habet entitatem propriam. Ex illo sequitur evidenter intentum, nam si praedicamenta denominantia substantiam distinguerentur ab ea realiter, circumscriptis illis realitatibus, nulla remaneret realitas substantiae propria. Si enim substantia materialis haberet [[aliunde figuram puta a qualitate]] aliunde extensionem, puta a quantitate, aliunde figuram, puta a qualitate, aliunde positionem, et ita de alus, istis circumscriptis, quaero quid remaneret pro entitate substantiae? Non apparet quod aliquid, nisi fingas totam realitatem substantiae materialis posse habere esse punctuale et in puncto salvari, quod non capit imaginario. Quia de ratione substantiae materialis et corporeae, quae distinguitur contra immaterialem et incorpoream, est quod habeat partem extra partem.3 Et ita videtur quod substantia materialis erit seipsa quanta, et seipsa terminata, et per consequens seipsa figurata. Seipsa, inquam, et per se, perseitate excludente rem aliam. Secunda suppositio (adn. in mg.: Secunda suppositio) est quod non est contradictio realitatem unam esse, realitate ab ea distincta non existente. Patet, quia non est contradictio nisi affirmetur et negetur idem de eodem,4 implicite vel explicite. Et ista suppositio 1Cf. Averroës In Metaph. V com. 14 (1562) 148EF. 2Cf. supra cap. 11 'De univocis'; cf. cap. 12 (f. 24v): Et manifestum est, quoniam non oportet multitudinem esse in conceptibus, sicut nec multitudo in conceptibus sequitur multitudinem eorum quae sunt in vocibus, necessario sumentibus nobis suppositiones has. 3Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham Summa logicae I c. 44 (OPh I 137): quantitas continua permanens nihil aliud est nisi res una habens partem situaliter distantem a parte. 4Cf. Aristot, De interp. 9, 18a29-30: In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse; Anal. post. 1,11 77a30; Tópica VI,6 143bl6: Nam de omni vel affirmatio vel negatio vera est; Metaph. IV,9 1005bl9- THE DEFENSORIUM OCKHAM1 1 3 concludit similiter intentum. Nam quia contradictio est corpus de genere substantiae (id est substantiam materialem) esse, et non esse quantum (id est non habere partem extra partem); ideo quantitas non est alia res a corpore. Item quia contradictio est magnitudinem esse, et ipsam non esse terminatam et figuratam; ideo figura non est alia res a corpore sive magnitudine. Item quia contradictio est totum esse, et non esse maius parvus distinguerentur specie cum sint plures partes materiae in magno quam in parvo. Solet etiam dici quod magnum et parvum non variant speciem. Istae viae (adn. in mg.: Quod quantitas continua non sit res distincta) non concludunt de quantitate continua, quia non repugnaret sibi unitas; nec ex parte sui, quin scilicet possit habere unitatem formae accidentalis convenientem, nec ex parte subiecti, quin scilicet posset habere subiectum unum. Sed sufficienter videtur convinci quod... (shrink)

This article has two tasks: to investigate the notions of space, time and causality in Schopenhauer’s theory of knowledge and, subsequently, to carry out a comparative study of the results obtained with the epistemological considerations between the first and second phase of Nietzsche’s thought. It is understood that conclusions concerning the world as representation had an echo in the first digressions of the author of The Birth of Tragedy on the conceptions of space, time and causality. However, the departures begin (...) to be perceived still in the first years of the 1870s. It is chosen to call the reflections on knowledge until On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, considering, besides the unsystematicity of the Nietzschean approaches, the maturation of the epistemological investigations in Human, All Too Human. It is discussed how the naturalistic aspects of the second phase of Nietzsche’s intellectual activity find implications in his conceptions of space, time and, above all, causality. It is emphasized, however, that it is not the intention of this work to argue that Nietzsche’s epistemology is originally derived from Schopenhauer or that it depends exclusively on the notions studied here. (shrink)

Este trabajo trata de la importancia que tienen los estudiantes de medicina para responder a las demandas de atención médica en México; alude al proceso histórico que determina esta situación y la construcción de la categoría “médicos en formación”; refiere las condiciones laborales, educativas y de salud de los estudiantes de medicina en las unidades médicas, y su impacto sobre la calidad de la atención médica. Desde la perspectiva ética y de los derechos humanos se plantea que los programas de (...) educación médica, y en particular la categoría de “médicos en formación”, pueden, paradójicamente, violentar tanto el derecho a la educación como el derecho a la atención médica, y dañar tanto la salud de los estudiantes como la de la población por ellos atendida. Se concluye que debe desarrollarse un nuevo respaldo ético docente asistencial para educación médica en las unidades de atención médica. (shrink)

The essential companion to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's The Phenomenom of Man, The Divine Milieu expands on the spiritual message so basic to his thought. He shows how man's spiritual life can become a participation in the destiny of the universe. Teilhard de Chardin -- geologist, priest, and major voice in twentieth-century Christianity -- probes the ultimate meaning of all physical exploration and the fruit of his own inner life. The Divine Milieu is a spiritual treasure for every religion bookshelf.

This article addresses the question how philosophy should be evaluated in a research-grant funding environment. It offers a new conception of philosophy that is inclusive and builds on familiar elements of professional, philosophical practice. Philosophy systematically questions the questions we ask, the concepts we use, and the values we hold. Its product is therefore rarely conclusive but can be embodied in everything we do. This is typical of explorative research and differentiates it from exploitative research, which constitutes the bulk of (...) funded research activity. This article argues that exploratory research is crucial for long-term progress and requires a distinct evaluative regime. (shrink)

: O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar, sob o viés psicanalítico, a relação entre o sujeito e seu Deus na medida em que essa relação está diretamente ligada ao próprio funcionamento do seu psiquismo. Ou seja, para a psicanálise a origem dessa relação está no próprio sujeito. Nesse sentido, retrataremos de maneira breve o caminho percorrido por Freud acerca da passagem do animismo às religiões e da importância do totemismo como um exemplo para aquilo que a psicanálise chamou de (...) registo simbólico. Tal registro possibilita pensar o (P)ai como metáfora e, portanto, situar Deus no lugar simbólico do Pai de todos, onipotente, onipresente, que protege e ao mesmo tempo castiga aqueles que desobedecem suas leis. A relação com a Lei internalizada pela metáfora paterna é a marca fundamental da estrutura neurótica que precisa administrar o conflito entre os desejos e as privações. Por fim, avançamos com a noção de Das Ding apresentada por Freud e desenvolvida por Lacan que representa o reencontro com o desde sempre perdido. O sujeito conseguirá algum tipo de relação com o Das Ding por meio da fantasia – recurso imaginário que reveste o impossível de possibilidades como a da salvação, da vida eterna e tantas outras promessas divinas. (shrink)

In the philosophy of memory there is a tension between a preservationist and a constructivist view of memory reflected in the debate between causalism and simulationism. Causalism is not only committed to the claim that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the remembered event and the content represented at retrieval but also that such connection is possible because of a content-preserving memory trace. Simulationism, by contrast, rejects the need for an appropriate causal condition and, thereby, makes the appeal (...) to memory traces unnecessary. In this paper I argue that while the are strong conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to support a constructivist view of memory, the empirical evidence also suggest that the initial formulation of simulationism needs to be revised. In particular, I argue, first, that simulationism’s commitment to a single cognitive system for mental time travel is likely wrong, and second, that simulationism cannot get rid of memory traces altogether, as they are still explanatorily indispensable when it comes to explaining a large number of memory-related phenomena. At the end, I end up suggesting a way of thinking about memory traces that, I think, is compatible with simulationism and a constructivist view of memory. If the view I put forth is on the right track, then an updated version of simulationism can help to dispel the dichotomy between causalism and simulationism as a false one. (shrink)

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

What is the relation between moral reasons and moral requirement? Specifically: what relation does an action have to bear to one’s moral reasons in order to count as morally required? This paper defends the following answer to this question: an action is morally required just in case the moral reasons in favor of that action are enough on their own to outweigh all of the reasons, moral and nonmoral, to perform any alternative. I argue that this decisive moral reason view (...) satisfies three key desiderata: it is compatible with either affirming or denying the existence of moral options; it vindicates moral rationalism, the thesis that an action can be morally required only if one ought to do it all things considered; and most distinctively, it explains why unexcused moral wrongdoing necessarily shows disregard for moral reasons. (shrink)

It has been argued that organizational structures (the way tasks are defined, allocated, and coordinated) can influence moral agency in organizations. In particular, low values on different structural parameters (functional concentration, specialization, separation, and formalization) are said to foster an organizational context (allowing for relating to the goals and output of the organization, moral deliberation, and social connectedness) that is conducive to moral agency. In this paper, we investigate the relation between the organizational structure and moral agency in the case (...) of a.s.r. (a large Dutch insurance company). While our empirical results fit the thesis that low values on structural parameters positively relate to moral agency, they also refine our understanding of the influence of structural parameters. In particular, our data suggest that the influence of functional concentration not only depends on whether it is low, but also on the type of criterion used for identifying business units; they suggest that the specific organizational context may put a limit to lowering design parameters and points at several non-structural factors that have an influence on the relation between structure and moral agency. In all, the paper contributes to a more detailed understanding of the conditions conducive to moral agency in organizations. (shrink)

Psychology has a WEIRD problem. It is overly reliant on participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies. Over the last decade this problem has come to be widely acknowledged, yet there has been little progress toward making psychology more diverse. This Element proposes that the lack of progress can be explained by the fact that the original WEIRD critique was too narrow in scope. Rather than a single problem of a lack of diversity among research participants, there are (...) at least four overlapping problems. Psychology is WEIRD not only in terms of who makes up its participant pool, but also in terms of its theoretical commitments, methodological assumptions, and institutional structures. Psychology as currently constituted is a fundamentally WEIRD enterprise. Coming to terms with this is necessary if we wish to make psychology relevant for all humanity. (shrink)

In discussions of nudging, transparency is often taken to be important; it is often suggested that a significant moral consideration to take into account when nudging is whether the nudge is transparent. Another consideration taken to be relevant is whether the nudge is easy to resist. Sometimes, these two considerations are taken to be importantly related: if we have reason to make nudges easy to resist, then we have reason to make them transparent, insofar as a nudge’s transparency is relevant (...) to whether the nudge is easy to resist. In this paper, we critically scrutinize this view. First, we draw out the purported connections between transparency and resistibility, combining them into what we call the Resistibility-to-Transparency Argument (RTA). Then, we do some conceptual groundwork elaborating on different forms of transparency mentioned in the debate. With this in place, we argue that in order to be plausible, the RTA must appeal to certain forms of transparency; those on which the transparency of a nudge depends on the nudgee’s ability to become aware of the relevant facts about the nudge. We then argue against the common assumption that in order for a nudge to be easy to resist for an individual, that individual needs to have the capacity to easily become aware of the relevant nudge facts. We conclude that the connection between the easy resistibility of a nudge and its transparency is, at best, a weak one. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta como intuito primordial a promoção de uma análise acerca das relações entre o naturalismo filosófico de Hume e a sua oposição ao ceticismo radical, estabelecendo, nesse sentido, uma vinculação entre as teses naturalistas do autor em questão e a sua argumentação em prol do ceticismo moderado. A dissertação, num primeiro momento, abordará sobre os elementos centrais da chamada “geografia mental”, proposta por David Hume na primeira seção de seu livro Investigação sobre o entendimento Humano. Além disso, (...) será destacado o esforço do pensador na utilização do método experimental para a elaboração de uma nova ciência da natureza humana, ressaltando os princípios da natureza humana nas condições de percepção e conhecimento. O texto dissertativo realizará uma elucidação dos principais conceitos do empirismo do autor escocês, tais como: o hábito, a formação da crença, o papel da experiência nas inferências causais e a negação da razão como fundamento do conhecimento. Sob essa perspectiva, a construção dissertativa estabelecerá uma defesa da vinculação de David Hume ao “ceticismo COMPLEXITAS REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA TEMÁTICA – ISSN: 2525-4154 – QUALIS B3. Ed. 2022, V7, n 02. p. 01-16. 2 mitigado” em razão do naturalismo presente em sua obra, isto é, da compreensão segundo a qual os princípios da natureza atuam na percepção humana, orientando os indivíduos em sua postura de adoção de crenças e “verdades provisórias” como fundamentos de suas condutas. Fundamentado sob a metodologia de abordagem dedutiva, o presente trabalho foi construído com a utilização de fontes bibliográficas. (shrink)

Paying attention to the inner workings of mathematicians has led to a proliferation of new themes in the philosophy of mathematics. Several of these have to do with epistemology. Philosophers of mathematical practice, however, have not (yet) systematically engaged with general (analytic) epistemology. To be sure, there are some exceptions, but they are few and far between. In this chapter, I offer an explanation of why this might be the case and show how the situation could be remedied. I contend (...) that it is only by conceiving the knowing subject(s) as embodied, fallible, and embedded in a specific context (along the lines of what has been done within social and feminist epistemology) that we can pursue an epistemology of mathematics sensitive to actual mathematical practice. I further suggest that this reconception of the knowing subject(s) does not force us to abandon the traditional framework of epistemology in which knowledge requires justified true belief. It does, however, lead to a fallible conception of mathematical justification that, among other things, makes Gettier cases possible. This shows that topics considered to be far removed from the interests of philosophers of mathematical practice might reveal to be relevant to them. (shrink)

The purpose of this contribution is to analyse climate change litigation in an innovative way, considering it as an example of “privatisation” of international law, and unravelling the “ecological” side of conflict-of-laws climate change litigation. The paper will first explain the concept of privatisation of law as applied to international law and what it means in the context of climate change litigation, before moving to a landmark case, whose appeal is still pending in front of a domestic court in Europe: (...) Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell plc. The focus of the analysis of the cases will be limited to the use of the conflict-of-laws mechanism present in the Rome II Regulation, namely Article 7. The paper critically assesses the principle of ubiquity included in this provision, by looking at the concept of “event giving rise to the damage” as applied in CO2 reduction claims in the existing legal scholarship and using an underexplored ecofeminist perspective. Inspired by the work “A relational feminist approach to conflict of laws” by Roxana Banu (2017), the paper argues for a relational understanding of the concept of “event” and goes further to consider in an ecofeminist perspective the environment as composed of human, non-human beings and natural objects, and of their relations with each other. The article is meant to be a starting point for further research, which for the first time applies ecofeminist theories to private international law. (shrink)

O presente artigo parte de um possível estranhamento que o livro de Foucault “As palavras e as coisas: uma arqueologia das ciências humanas” pode nos causar. Retomando principalmente o prefácio do livro, procuraremos, contudo, desfazer o estranhamento inicial, ao apontar para certa familiaridade que a obra parece ter com alguns temas já presentes na história da filosofia. A hipótese é a de que os problemas filosóficos mais gerais enfrentados pelo livro dizem respeito à tese do conhecimento como interpretação e ao (...) problema da relação entre as palavras e as coisas, entre o ver e o dizer. Tese e problemas que não são estranhos a Nietzsche, por exemplo, que, portanto, parece ter influenciado o pensamento de Foucault para além do tema do poder e da genealogia. (shrink)

Vico e Wittgenstein apresentam concepções diferentes a respeito da relação entre linguagem e mundo. Essa diferença resulta no modo como julgam a possibilidade da ética ser tratada dentro da linguagem, portanto, de possuir sentido. Enquanto Wittgenstein, no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, apresenta uma concepção da relação linguagem-mundo pautada no isomorfismo da forma lógica das sentenças com a forma lógica dos fatos, Vico, na Ciência Nova, a concebe por meio das experiências e condições de existência humanas, na qual a linguagem diz do mundo (...) através de relações metafóricas que estabelecem ligações entre o diverso. Por conta disso, o primeiro julga que sentenças éticas seriam desprovidas de sentido, pois não refletem a forma lógica de fato algum. Já o segundo, ao notar que elementos como as fábulas contribuem para dispor os homens favoravelmente para a vida civil, julga que cumprem efetivamente uma função ética. (shrink)

A partir das noções de intelectual orgânico, clássico e revolucionário, tais como apresentadas por Sartre nas Conferências dadas no Japão em 1965 e em entrevista de 1970 (publicadas em conjunto em Situações VIII), pretendemos compartilhar questões sobre qual seria o papel dos intelectuais no mundo das redes sociais, e se ainda é possível pensar em alguma função. Em primeiro lugar, descreveremos a classe social a partir da qual o intelectual surge e quais são as contradições com as quais se depara (...) e que desvela, sobre a sociedade e sobre si mesmo. Por fim, atualizando a questão sartriana, tal como o próprio filósofo fez com a noção de universal singular discutida a partir de Kierkegaard (no artigo L'Universel Singulier, publicado em Situações IX), traremos elementos que complexificam o alcance de seu papel e a esperança em sua efetividade, ainda mais quando os próprios intelectuais contribuem para a manutenção dos valores da classe dominante, mesmo que aparentemente sejam contrários a eles. (shrink)

Este escrito pretende examinar los modelos de dominación socioambiental colonial, moderno, capitalista que impone una espiritualidad capitalista, con la finalidad de abdicar sus fuerzas y comprender lo valioso que es la resistencia decolonial por la justicia socioambiental, mediante los saberes, territorios e imágenes; y sobre todo, para comprender el papel de los movimientos sociales que resisten desde la cosmoviviencia de la eco-espiritualidad en el marco filosófico fenomenológico y desde la teoría crítica de las ciencias sociales y teniendo en cuenta las (...) resistencias descoloniales por la justicia socioambiental. (shrink)